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Abstract
In this paper we consider cryptographic applications of the arithmetic on the hyperoctahedral
group. On an appropriate subgroup of the latter, we particularly propose to construct public key
cryptosystems based on the discrete logarithm. The fact that the group of signed permutations
has rich properties provides fast and easy implementation and makes these systems resistant to
attacks like the Pohlig-Hellman algorithm. The only negative point is that storing and transmitting
permutations need large memory. Using together the hyperoctahedral enumeration system and
what is called subexceedant functions, we define a one-to-one correspondance between natural
numbers and signed permutations with which we label the message units.
Keywords : Signed Permutation, Public Key System, Discrete Logarithm Problem, Hyperoc-
tahedral Enumeration System, Subexceedant Function
1 Introduction
The term cryptography refers to the study of techniques providing information security. Several math-
ematical objects have been used in this field to label the so-called message units. These objects are
often integers. They may also be points or vectors on some curves. For this work, we shall use signed
permutations.
Let us denote by:
• [n] the set {1, · · · , n},
• [±n] the set {−n, · · · ,−1, 1, · · · , n},
• Sn the symmetric group of degree n.
Definition 1.1. A bijection π : [±n] −→ [±n] satisfying π(−i) = −π(i) for all i ∈ [±n] is called
”signed permutation”.
We can also write a signed permutation π in the form
π =
(
1 2 . . . n
ε1σ1 ε2σ2 . . . εnσn
)
with σ ∈ Sn and εi ∈ {±1} .
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Under the ordinary composition of mappings, all signed permutations of the elements of [n] form a
group Bn called hyperoctahedral group of rank n. We write πk = π ◦ · · · ◦ π︸ ︷︷ ︸
k-times
for an integer k and
π ∈ Bn and when we multiply permutations, the leftmost permutation acts first. For example,(
1 2 3 4
1 −3 4 2
)
◦
(
1 2 3 4
3 −2 4 1
)
=
(
1 2 3 4
3 −4 1 −2
)
.
Before the 1970’s, to cipher or decipher a message, two users of cryptographic system must safely
exchange information (the private key) which is not known by anyone else. New keys could be peri-
odically distributed so as to keep the enemy guessing. In 1976, W. Diffie and M. Hellman [1] discov-
ered an entirely different type of cryptosystem for which all of the necessary information to send an
enciphered message is publicly available without enabling anyone to read the secret message. With
this kind of system called public key, it is possible for two parties to initiate secret communications
without exchanging any preliminary information or ever having had any prior contact.
The security of public key cryptosystems is based on the hardness of some mathematical prob-
lems. As a public key cryptosystem consists of a private key (the deciphering key) that is kept secret
and a public key (the enciphering key) which is accessible to the public, then the straightforward way
to break the system is to draw the private key from the public key. Therefore, the required computation
cost is equivalent to solving these difficult mathematical problems. For instance for the two particu-
larly important examples of public key cryptosystems : RSA and Diffie-Hellman, both are connected
with fundamental questions in number theory which are : difficulty of factoring a large composite
integer whose prime factors are not known in advance and intractability of discrete logarithm in the
multiplicative group of a large finite field, respectively.
Definition 1.2. The discrete logarithm problem in the finite group G to the base g ∈ G is the problem
: given y ∈ G, of finding an integer x such that gx = y, provided that such an integer exists (in other
words, provided that y is in the subgroup generated by g).
If we really want our random element y of G to have a discrete logarithm, g must be a generator
of G.
Example 1. Let G = (Z/19Z)
∗ be the multiplicative group of integers modulo 19. The successive
powers of 2 reduced mod 19 are : 2, 4, 8, 16, 13, 7, 14, 9, 18, 17, 15, 11, 3, 6, 12, 5, 10, 1. Let g be the
generator 2, then the discrete logarithm of 9 to the base 2 is 8.
In many ways, the group of signed permutations is analogous to the multiplicative group of a
finite field. For this purpose, cryptosystems based on the latter can be translated to systems using the
hyperoctahedral group.
This work addresses public key cryptosystems based on the group of signed permutations and
related to the discrete logarithm problem. We shall illustrate this in section 3 by an hyperoctahedral
group analogue for the Diffie-Hellman key exchange system then by describing two hyperoctahedral
group public key cryptosystems for transmitting information. We shall also explain why there is no
subexponential time algorithms to break the proposed systems. Before introducing the cryptosystems
themselves, we give in section 2 a method to define a bijection between integers and signed permuta-
tions. This time, we first convert the natural number in hyperoctahedral system and then we use the
result to compute the corresponding signed permutation by means of subexceedant function.
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2 Integer representation of signed permutations
2.1 Converting from one base to another
Definition 2.1. Hyperoctahedral number system is a system that expresses all natural number n of N
in the form :
n =
k(n)∑
i=0
di.Bi , where k(n) ∈ N, di ∈ {0, 1, 2, · · · , 2i + 1} and Bi = 2ii! . (1)
This definition is motivated by the fact that Bi is the cardinal of the hyperoctahedral group Bi.
To denote the non-negative integer n of the equation (1) in the hyperoctahedral system, we use by
convention the (k + 1)-digits representation
dkdk−1 · · · d2d1d0 .
Theorem 2.2. Every positive integer has an unique representation in the hyperoctahedral system.
Before giving the proof of this theorem, these are some properties of the hyperoctahedral system.
Lemma 2.3. If n = dk · · · d1d0 is a number in hyperoctahedral system, then
0 6 n 6 Bk+1 − 1
Proof. Since 0 6 di 6 2i+ 1, we have
0 6
k∑
i=0
diBi 6
k∑
i=0
(2i + 1)Bi .
Recall that Bi = 2
ii! ,
(2i+ 1)Bi = (2(i + 1− 1) + 1)Bi
= (2(i + 1)− 1)Bi
= 2(i + 1)Bi −Bi
= Bi+1 −Bi .
Therefore,
k∑
i=0
(2i + 1)Bi =
k∑
i=0
(Bi+1 −Bi) = Bk+1 −B0 = Bk+1 − 1 .
Lemma 2.4. Let n = dk · · · d1d0 be a number in hyperoctahedral system, then
dkBk 6 n < (dk + 1)Bk .
Proof. Letm = dk−1 · · · d1d0. From lemma 2.3, 0 6 m < Bk. We also have n = dkBk +m, hence
dkBk 6 n < Bk + dkBk = (1 + dk)Bk .
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Now, we can proceed to the demonstration of theorem 2.2 which states the one-to-oneness between
non negative integers and hyperoctahedral base numbers.
Proof. Let an · · · a1a0 with an 6= 0 and bm · · · b1b0, bm 6= 0 be two representations of a positive
integer N in hyperoctahedral system. First, bm ≥ 1 and an ≥ 1 imply
Bm ≤ bmBm ≤ bm · · · b1b0 and Bn ≤ an · · · a1a0.
The relation n = m is immediate because if n < m then
Bm ≥ Bn+1 > an · · · a1a0
by lemma 2.3 so
bm · · · b1b0 > an · · · a1a0 .
Similarly, ifm < n then
an · · · a1a0 > bm · · · b1b0 .
We get a contradiction. Consequently n = m and ai = bi for all i ∈ {0, 1, . . . , n} by induction and
by the unicity of the expression N = anBn + rn with rn = an−1 · · · a1a0 < Bn.
To express a positive integer n in the hyperoctahedral system, one proceeds with the following
manner. Start by dividing n by 2 and let d0 be the rest r0 of the expression
n = r0 + (2)q0 .
Divide q0 by 4, and let d1 be the rest r1 of the expression
q0 = r1 + (4)q1 .
Continue the procedure by dividing qi−1 by 2(i + 1) and taking di := ri of the expression
qi−1 = ri + 2(i + 1)qi
until ql = 0 for some l ∈ N. In this way, we obtain n = dl : dl−1 : · · · : d1 : d0 and we also have
n = d0 + 2 (d1 + 4 · (d2 + 2(3) · (d3 + · · · ))) .
Now let n = dk−1 : dk−2 : · · · : d1 : d0 be a number in hyperoctahedral system. By definition 2.1,
one way to convert n to the usual decimal system is to calculate
dk−12
k−1(k − 1)! + · · ·+ d1.2 + d0 .
In practice, one can use this algorithm :
Input : An integer dk−1 : dk−2 : · · · : d1 : d0 in hyperoctahedral system.
Output : An integer d in decimal system.
1. initiate the value of d : d← dk−1
2. for i from k − 1 to 1 do : d← d.2.i + di−1
3. return d
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2.2 A bijection between the subexceedant functions and permutations
Definition 2.5. A subexceedant function f on [n] is a map f : [n] −→ [n] such that
1 6 f(i) 6 i for all i ∈ [n] .
We will denote by Fn the set of all subexceedant functions on [n], and we will represent a subex-
ceedant function f over [n] by the word f(1)f(2) · · · f(n).
Example 2. These are the sets Fn for n = 1, 2, 3 :
F1 = {1}
F2 = {11, 12}
F3 = {111, 112, 113, 121, 122, 123}.
It is easy to verify that card Fn = n!, since from each subexceedant f over [n − 1], one can
obtain n distinct subexceedant functions over [n] by adding any integer i ∈ [n] at the end of the word
representing f .
We will give a bijection between Sn and Fn. Let be the map
φ : Fn −→ Sn
f 7−→ σf = (1 f(1))(2 f(2)) · · · (n f(n)) .
Notice that there is an abuse of notation in the definition of σf . Indeed, if f(i) = i, then the cycle
(i f(i)) = (i) does not really denote a transposition but simply the identity permutation.
Lemma 2.6. The map φ is a bijection from Fn onto Sn.
Proof. Since Sn and Fn both have cardinality n!, it suffices to prove that f is injective. Let f and g
be two subexceedant functions on [n]. Assume that φ(f) = φ(g) i.e. σf = σg. So we have :
(1 f(1))(2 f(2)) · · · (n f(n)) = (1 g(1))(2 g(2)) · · · (n g(n)). (2)
Since σf = σg, then in particular σf (n) = σg(n). By definition σf (n) = f(n) and σg(n) = g(n),
so f(n) = g(n). Let us multiply both members of equation (2) on the right by the permutation
(n f(n)) = (n g(n)), we obtain :
(1 f(1))(2 f(2)) · · · (n− 1 f(n− 1)) = (1 g(1))(2 g(2)) · · · (n− 1 g(n− 1)).
Now, if we apply the same process to this equation, we obtain f(n− 1) = g(n− 1). By iterating, we
conclude that f(i) = g(i) for all integers i ∈ [n] and then f = g.
Let σ be a permutation of the symmetric group Sn and f be the inverse image of σ by φ. Then f
can be constructed as below :
1. Set f(n) = σ(n).
2. Multiply σ on the right by (n σ(n)) (this operation consists in exchanging the image of n and
the image of σ−1(n)), we obtain a new permutation σ1 having n as a fixed point. Thus σ1 can
be considered as a permutation of Sn−1. Then set f(n− 1) = σ1(n− 1).
3. In order to obtain f(n − 2), apply now the same process to the permutation σ1 by multiplying
σ1 by (n− 1 σ1(n− 1)). Iteration determines f(i) for all integers i of [n].
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2.3 Mapping hyperoctahedral base numbers to signed permutations
Let dn−1 dn−2 · · · d1 d0 be a n-digits number in hyperoctahedral system. That is di ∈ {0, 1, 2, · · · , 2i+
1} for i = 0, · · · , n− 1.
Writing di = 2qi + ri where ri ∈ {0, 1} and qi ∈ {0, . . . , i}, gives
• the subexceedant function f = f(1) · · · f(n) with f(i) = 1 + qi−1, i = 1, . . . , n
• and the sequence (ε1, . . . , εn) with εi = (−1)ri−1 for i = 1, . . . , n.
So to each integer dn−1 dn−2 · · · d1 d0, we associate the signed permutation(
1 2 . . . n
ε1σ1 ε2σ2 . . . εnσn
)
where σ = σ1 · · · σn is the permutation associated to the subexceedant function f by the map
φ : Fn −→ Sn
f 7−→ σf = (1f(1))(2f(2)) · · · (nf(n)) .
Now, let π =
(
1 2 . . . n
ε1σ1 ε2σ2 . . . εnσn
)
be a signed permutation. As φ is a bijection, from π we
have
f = f(1) · · · f(n) = φ−1(σ) and ri−1 =
{
0 if εi = 1
1 if εi = −1
for i = 1, . . . , n.
The digits di = 2(f(i+1)−1)+ri, i = 0, . . . , n−1 form the hyperoctahedral number dn−1 dn−2 · · · d1 d0.
It is easy to verify that di ∈ {0, . . . , 2i+ 1}. We have
1 6 f(i) 6 i for i = 1, . . . , n
0 6 f(i+ 1) 6 i+ 1 for i = 0, . . . , n− 1
0 6 2(f(i+ 1)− 1) 6 2i for i = 0, . . . , n− 1
0 6 di 6 2i+ 1 because 0 6 ri 6 1.
3 Some cryptosystems based on hyperoctahedral group
We suppose that we are using message units with signed permutations as equivalents (according to
section 2) in some publicly known large hyperoctahedral group Bn.
3.1 Analog of the Diffie-Helman key exchange
The Diffie-Hellman key exchange [1] which was the first public key cryptosystem originally used the
multiplicative group of a finite field. It can be adapted for signed permutations group as follow.
Suppose that two users Alice and Bob want to agree upon a secret key, a random element of Bn,
which they will use to encrypt their subsequent messages to one another. They first choose a large
integer n for the hyperoctahedral group Bn and select a signed permutation β ∈ Bn to serve as their
”base” and make them public. Alice selects a random integer 0 < a < Bn, which she keeps secret,
and computes βa ∈ Bn which she makes public. Bob does the same. He selects a random integer
0 < b < Bn, and transmits β
b to Alice over a public channel. Alice and Bob agree on the secret key
βab by computing (βb)a and (βa)b respectively.
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3.2 Analog of the ElGamal system
Suppose user ”A” requires sending a message µ to user ”B”. As in the key exchange system above,
we start with a fixed publicly known hyperoctahedral group Bn for a large integer n and a signed
permutation β ∈ Bn (preferably, but not necessarily, a generator) as base. Each user selects a random
integer 0 < u < |β| (instead of u we take a for user ”A” and b for user ”B”) which is kept secret, and
computes βu that he publishes as a public key. With the public key βb, user ”A” encrypt the message
µ and sends the pair of signed permutations (m1 = β
a,m2 = µ.(β
b)a) to user ”B”. To recover µ, B
computes (mb1)
−1 = ((βa)b)−1 and multiplies m2 on the right by the result.
3.3 Analog of the Massey-Omura system for message transmission.
We assume the same setup as in the previous subsection. Suppose that Alice wants to send Bob a
message µ. She chooses a random integer c satisfying 0 < c < Bn and g.c.d.(c,Bn) = 1, and
transmits µc to Bob. Next, Bob chooses a random integer d with the same properties, and transmits
(µc)d to Alice. Then Alice transmits (µcd)c
′
= µd back to Bob, where c′c ≡ 1 mod Bn. Finally,
Bob computes (µd)d
′
where d′d ≡ 1 mod Bn.
3.4 Security
For the Diffie-Hellman’s key exchange above, a third party knows only the elements β , βa and βb
of Bn which are public knowledge. Obtaining βab knowing only βa and βb is as hard as taking the
discrete logarithm a from β and βa (or b knowing β and βb). Then an unauthorized third party must
solve the discrete logarithm problem to the base β ∈ Bn to determine the key.
Both ElGamal’s [5] and Massey-Omura’s [4] cryptosystems are essentially variants of Diffie-
Hellman’s key exchange system. Therefore, breaking either of the systems above requires the solution
of the discrete logarithm problem for hyperoctahedral group.
Definition 3.1. The hyperoctahedral discrete logarithm problem to the base β ∈ Bn is the problem,
given π ∈ Bn, of finding an integer x such that π = βx if such x exists.
Many improvements are made for solving the discrete logarithm problem in finite group. In hype-
roctahedral group based cryptosystems of the sort discussed above, one does not work with the entire
group Bn, but rather with cyclic subgroups : the group < β > in the Diffie-Hellman system and
ElGamal system and the group < µ > in the Massey-Omura system where we designate by
• < π >= {πi | i = 1, . . . , |π|} the cyclic subgroup of Bn generated by π ∈ Bn,
• |π| the order of the signed permutation π.
In other words, one works in the subgroup generated by the base of the discrete logarithm in each
proposed system.
Choice of a suitable base The order of the cyclic subgroup of Bn has an important role to avoid an
easy solution of the discrete logarithm. Recall that we can also represent a signed permutation π in
the form
π =
(
1 2 . . . n
ε1σ(1) ε2σ(2) . . . εnσ(n)
)
with σ ∈ Sn and εi ∈ {±1} .
As stated in the work of Victor Reiner [2], a signed permutation decomposes uniquely into a product
of commuting cycles just as permutations do.
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Example 3. The disjoint cycle form of
(
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
3 6 −2 7 −5 −1 4
)
is
(
1 3 2 6
3 −2 6 −1
)(
4 7
7 4
)(
5
−5
)
.
Definition 3.2. The order of a signed permutation π is the smallest positive integer m such that
πm = ι where ι denotes the identity permutation.
An ℓ-cycle C =
(
i1 i2 . . . iℓ−1 iℓ
ε1i2 ε2i3 . . . εℓ−1iℓ εℓi1
)
where εi ∈ {±1} has order ℓ. The proof of
the following theorem can be found in [6].
Theorem 3.3. The order of a permutation written in disjoint cycle form is the least common multiple
of the lengths of the cycles.
Let us now assume that we have β ∈ Bn as base of the discrete logarithm. The order of < β >
can be very large for a large value of n, since the disjoint cycles of β can be selected in such a way
that their least common multiple be very large. Therefore brute force search is inefficient to solve
the discrete logarithm problem to the base β ∈ Bn. < β > is a cyclic group of finite order so it is
commutative. Thus, in order to avoid an easy solution to the discrete logarithm problem using the
techniques that apply to any finite abelian group (which take approximately
√
p operations, where p
is the largest prime dividing the order of the group), it is important for the order of the commutative
group < β > to be non smooth, that is, divisible by a large prime.
Definition 3.4. Let n be a positive real number. we say that n is smooth if all of the prime factors of
n are small.
The method of Pohlig-Hellman [3] can efficiently computes the discrete logarithm in a group G if
its order is B-smooth for a reasonably small B.
Definition 3.5. Let B be a positive real number. An integer is said to be B-smooth if it is not divisible
by any prime greater than B.
The following theorem allows to generate the base β so that the order of the subgroup < β > of
Bn have arbitrary smoothness.
Theorem 3.6. Let p be a prime. For a large integer n, a cyclic subgroup G of Bn which its order is
p-smooth and is not (p − 1)-smooth can be constructed.
Proof. Let n be a large integer and p ≤ n a prime. There exists a p-cycle γp ∈ Bn. Let γp, C1, C2, . . . , Ck ∈
Bn be disjoint cycles of length respectively p, l1, l2, . . . , lk with
1 ≤ li ≤ p for i = 1, . . . , k and
k∑
i=1
li ≤ n− p .
Let us now consider the signed permutation π = γpC1C2 . . . Ck ∈ Bn of order
|π| = lcm(p, l1, l2, . . . , lk) .
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Let q be a prime such that q|lmc(p, l1, l2, . . . , lk). We show that q ≤ p. Let us suppose that q > p. We
obtain li < p < q which implies q ∤ |π| so q ≤ p. We have just shown that every prime q dividing the
order of π is smaller than p, that is, |π| is p-smooth. The order | < π > | = |π| of the cyclic subgroup
< π > of Bn generated by π is p-smooth but it is not (p − 1)-smooth because p | | < π > | and
p > p− 1.
This theorem provides high flexibility in selecting a subgroup of Bn on which cryptosystem resists
to attacks by Silver-Pohlig-Hellman’s algorithm.
The cryptosystems that we have proposed are easy to implement by applying optimized method
for exponentiation. Moreover, the multiplication on Bn which is the composition of mappings can be
performed in time O(n). However, as we must work in a very large hyperoctahedral group, the need
of large memory from the point of view implementation requires improvements.
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